The U.S. Intelligence Community published four intelligence estimates prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, all of which underestimated the Soviets’ intentions to install strategic weapons in Cuba.
January 17, 1962, The Threat to U.S. Security Interests in the Caribbean Area (SNIE 80-62): Establishment of Soviet bases on Cuba is “unlikely for some time to come.”
March 21, 1962, The Situation and Prospects in Cuba (NIE 85-62): The USSR would “almost certainly never intend to hazard its own safety for the sake of Cuba.”
August 1, 1962, The Situation and Prospects in Cuba (NIE 85-2-62): It is “unlikely” that the Soviet Bloc will station “Bloc combat units of any description” in Cuba, at least over the next year.
September 19, 1962, The Military Buildup in Cuba (SNIE 85-3-62): Despite evidence of significant Soviet buildup, “Soviet policy remains fundamentally unaltered.”
On October 15, 1962—a mere three weeks after the September SNIE was published—photos from a U2 spy-plane revealed that the Soviets had installed intermediate-range missiles in Cuba. Long-range missiles were discovered two days later.
At what points in 1962 could IC analysts have employed SATs to strengthen their understanding of Soviet activities in Cuba and to provide greater warning to policymakers about the potential course of events? Which SATs should they have used? Your response should not exceed two pages.For more information on understanding of Soviet activities check on this:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Union